In the matter of Director-General, Department of Communities (Child Safety Services) & Rolfston, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision to allow the child of the marriage to stay in Australia.
With the consent of her father, the only child of the marriage travelled from the USA to Australia with her mother in November 2008 to holiday with the maternal grandmother for six months. The child was two years of age at the time.
At the invitation of the mother, the father travelled to Australia in March 2009 for a holiday. During this holiday, the mother informed the father that the marriage was at an end and she would not be travelling back to the USA. Before the father left Australia (later that month), the parents contacted the Child Support Agency ("CSA") to obtain a child support assessment, and the child was enrolled in and commenced at a Brisbane based infant school.
Between March 2009 and June 2009, the parents communicated by email about the parenting arrangements for the child and engaged a mediator who prepared a Parenting Agreement ("the Agreement"). The father asserted that he wanted to reconcile with the mother and this is one of the major reasons for his participation in the mediation.
Both parties subsequently signed the Agreement and the mother then sought to ratify the Agreement in the Family Court of New York. The father opposed the ratification of the Agreement and filed an application in the Family Court of New York seeking orders for “custody and residence” of the child. The father’s application was dismissed.
On 19 November 2009, the Director-General, Department of Communities (Child Safety Services), acting as the State Central Authority for Queensland (“the Central Authority”) applied in Australia seeking the return of the child to the USA. The Central Authority asserted that the child had been wrongfully retained in Australia by her mother.
that Murphy J did not err in finding that the child was not habitually resident in the USA on 30 June 2009;
Murphy J did not “put the cart before the horse” in determining habitual residence first. Murphy J rightly considered the issue of wrongful retention (habitual residence), and then would have if necessary, considered consent or acquiescence under regulation 16(3). Of course, it was not necessary for the trial judge to consider the later given his finding on habitual residence;
“Habitual residence and acquiescence in regulation 16(3) are distinct concepts. The onus of establishing the child’s habitual residence is on the Central Authority…and the onus of establishing that a parent has acquiesced to the child’s removal or retention would be on the respondent.”
the most significant piece of evidence of the parties’ intentions was the parenting agreement;
the child lost her habitual place of residence through the parents signing the parenting agreement